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 Abstract  
This paper reports safety leaders’ perceptions of safety culture in one of Australasia’s largest 
construction organisations. A modified Delphi method was used including two rounds of data 
collection. The first round involved 41 semi-structured interviews with safety leaders within 
the organisation. The second round involved an online quantitative perception survey, with 
the same sample, aimed at confirming the key themes identified in the interviews. 
Participants included Senior Executives, Corporate Managers, Project Managers, Safety 
Managers and Site Supervisors. Interview data was analysed using qualitative thematic 
analysis, and the survey data was analysed using descriptive statistics. Leaders’ definitions 
and descriptions of safety culture were primarily action-oriented and some confusion was 
evident due to the sometimes implicit nature of culture in organisations. Leadership was 
identified as a key factor for positive safety culture in the organisation, and there was an 
emphasis on leaders demonstrating commitment to safety, and being visible to the project-
based workforce.  Barriers to safety culture improvement were also identified, including the 
subcontractor management issues, pace of change, and reporting requirements. The survey 
data provided a quantitative confirmation of the interview themes, with some minor 
discrepancies. The findings highlight that safety culture is a complex construct, which is 
difficult to define, even for experts in the organisation. Findings on the key factors indicated 
consistency with the current literature; however the perceptions of barriers to safety culture 
offer a new understanding in to how safety culture operates in practice.   
 
Keywords: safety culture; qualitative research; leaders’ perceptions; construction industry; 
modified Delphi method   
 
 1. Introduction 
While the role safety culture plays in the construction industry is the subject of a growing 
body of research, in practice the dynamic nature of the industry continues to test existing 
safety culture approaches. This paper presents findings from a collaborative industry and 
university research project focusing on safety culture in one of Australasia’s largest 
construction organisations. The research program takes a formative approach to investigating 
safety culture, encompassing both the theoretical literature and the importance of industry-
derived understandings of culture.   
1.1. Workplace incidents and the construction industry 
It is estimated that 640,700 persons suffer a work related injury each year in Australia 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010), and the economic cost of work related injuries in 
Australia is estimated to be approximately $38.3 billion each year, based on the most recent 
available data (Australian Safety and Compensation Council, 2009).  In addition to the 
economic costs, work related injuries also have social and business impacts, such as loss of 
goodwill and business reputation, as well as considerable impact on the individual’s family 
networks.   
Similar to the UK and USA, the Australian construction industry is over-represented in the 
occupational injury and death statistics. There were 40 fatalities recorded in the preliminary 
data for 2008–09, which was the highest number of fatalities of all industries. This 
corresponds to a fatality rate of 5.9 fatalities per 100 000 employees in 2008–09, which is 
more than twice the rate of 2.3 for all industries (Safe Work Australia, 2010). The economic 
and social costs of workplace incidents are being tackled by industry on several fronts; and 
safety culture is now broadly acknowledged as a significant concept in workplace health and 
safety approaches.  
Whilst the causes of workplace incidents in the construction industry vary, the context in 
which construction work is carried out is an important factor in workplace safety incidents 
(Misnan & Mohammed, 2007). Construction industry workers are exposed to significant 
hazards and risks as part of their everyday work - such as working at height, working around 
mobile plant and live traffic, working with underground and above ground services - and 
many of these are well-identified and managed through project risk procedures. However, the 
reality of construction work is that these hazards are present in a dynamic and diverse 
environment where each job presents a unique combination of situation, person and task 
factors.  
Construction work is project-based, with works lasting anywhere from a week to a few years, 
making the establishment and maintenance of work group identities difficult. The type of 
work is also varied, with construction work including commercial and residential buildings, 
roads and motorways, tunnels and bridges, railway lines, electrical, gas and water services, 
and work in open-cut mines. In addition, the construction industry operates in a contractor 
environment, where primary project contractors often employ subcontractors, to the extent of 
up to 90% of the workforce on any given project (Biggs, Sheahan & Dingsag, 2005). This 
means that the majority of the workforce is highly transient, with regular movement between 
construction companies, projects, and work sites. Furthermore, this takes place in an already 
dynamic working environment which increases the subsequent risk exposure for workers. 
Taken together, is it clear that although the hazards may seem simple to identify, managing 
safety on a construction project is not a simple task, and the complexity of the work type and 
workforce presents a challenge to safety professionals and management.  
1.2. Safety culture theory 
The safety culture field is home to a number of different disciplines, and remains 
conceptually fragmented and confused – to the extent that despite over thirty years of 
research on safety culture, there remains no universally accepted definition (Zohar, 2010). 
Glendon (2003) describes the concept of safety culture as problematic, with definitions often 
blurred and inconsistently applied.  Perhaps the most cited definition adopted considers safety 
culture “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management” (ASCNI, 1993). It is common for researchers 
to make their own adaptations to this definition, based on their theoretical position or industry 
context. In a review of safety culture theory and research between 1980 and 2000, 
Guldenmund (2000) cites at least 18 different definitions of the safety culture/safety climate 
construct, highlighting the fragmented nature of the field.  Cooper (2000) suggests that the 
broadness of safety culture definitions to date has contributed to the inconsistent 
operationalisation of the concept, and a heavy reliance on safety climate as a surrogate 
measure for safety culture. Despite this, whichever definition is employed, scholars agree that 
safety culture is an important concept (Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2010).   
Researchers of culture tend to take one of two approaches: interpretive or functionalist 
(Glendon, Clarke & McKenna, 2006). Interpretive approaches view culture as an emergent 
property that is a complex outcome of all employees, not just senior managers, and that 
culture cannot be ‘engineered’ quickly, but through organisational learning over time (e.g., 
Cox & Cheyne (2000). In contrast, functionalist approaches view culture as something that 
can be deliberately manipulated by management to support corporate interests, and is largely 
top-down driven (e.g., Reason (2000) & Hopkins (1995)). Both approaches have considerable 
support in the literature, and many now take an integrated approach (Glendon & Stanton, 
2000). Furthermore, some researchers view safety culture as a desired state which is rarely 
attained (absolutist position; e.g., Reason, 1997), whereas others view safety culture as a 
continuum whereby organisations are placed according to the extent to which safety is a part 
of their core business and practices (relativist position; e.g., Hudson, 2007).   
The current research program takes an integrated approach to examining safety culture, 
adopting an interpretive understanding of safety culture as a relativist concept (i.e., all 
organisations have a safety culture, but differ in their maturity and effectiveness) and a 
functionalist view of culture change (i.e., that it is driven by the leaders of the organisation 
and can be deliberately improved through targeted interventions).  
With regard to the content of safety culture, this research program takes an approach from 
organisational culture theorists (Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1992), where culture is 
described as having three distinct layers, namely, basic assumptions (core); espoused values 
(middle); and artefacts (outer layer). Each layer differs in its visibility to outsiders and its 
consciousness with members, with the outer layers being easier to identify and measure in 
research. Guldenmund (2000) suggests a causal pathway between the layers, using the more 
common terms of safety culture, safety climate and safety behaviour. This causal pathway 
considers the combination of individuals’ safety attitudes (safety climate) a consequence of 
the basic assumptions of the organisation’s members (safety culture). The evaluative 
responses to the safety climate are then revealed in the organisation’s artefacts, including 
individuals’ safety behaviour.  
In addition to definitional difficulties, the factors that comprise safety culture are also 
frequently debated in the literature. Early empirical research on safety culture and climate 
focused on exploring its multi-dimensional nature (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer & 
Beland, 1991; Zohar, 1980). In one of the earliest studies on safety climate, Zohar (1980) 
proposed an eight-factor model, which was later tested and refined to a three-factor model 
(Brown & Holmes, 1986). Interestingly, of the studies reviewed by Guldenmund (2000), the 
majority were exploratory, and those that were confirmatory did not support previous factor 
structures, further highlighting the disparity in safety culture descriptions.  In a study with 
construction workers, two factors were found to provide the best fit: management’s 
commitment to safety, and worker’s involvement in safety (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). 
Later studies on the role of safety leadership and management corroborate this result (Biggs 
et al., 2005; Dingsdag, Biggs & Sheahan, 2007; Flin et al., 2000; Zohar, 2010). Furthermore, 
research on the role of communication (Zohar, 2010) and quality of relationships (Carmeli & 
Gittel, 2009) highlight that safety culture is a complex construct.  
Other research places culture in the context of other organisational elements. Alignment 
theory (Semler, 1997) suggests that congruence or alignment between the various elements of 
an organisation leads to optimum performance. Whilst the theory encapsulates a broad view 
of organisational performance, it can also be specifically applied to safety, as it is measured 
by performance indicators relevant to the organisation. The nine organisational elements 
identified in alignment theory are: environment; vision, values and purpose; strategy; culture; 
structures and systems; rewards; practices; behaviour; and performance. Considering the 
degree of alignment between the different elements may provide an important perspective on 
the interdependencies of safety culture within the organisation. Importantly, the theory 
suggests, in line with the functionalist perspective discussed earlier, that alignment can be 
deliberately improved by organisational leaders through identifying leverage points across the 
elements and maximising alignment opportunities.  
1.3. Practical application of safety culture 
Whilst the academic literature has struggled to define, describe and measure safety culture, 
high-risk industries have been applying the safety culture concept to their safety practices for 
decades (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; IAEA, 1991). In Australia, the mining industry has adopted 
safety culture assessment tools and programs (Minerals Council of Australia, 1999), and 
more recently considerable work has been undertaken in the construction industry (Dingsdag 
et al., 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mohammed, 2002) and in the road safety field 
(Banks, Davey & Brownlow, 2006; Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2009). Safety culture is 
increasingly being recognised as a useful concept for understanding and manipulating the 
processes through which organisational leaders influence frontline workers (Dingsdag et al., 
2007).  
However, from an industry perspective, questions remain regarding the gap between the 
operationalisation of the elements of safety culture and their link to safety outcomes, 
particularly at different levels within an organisation. Furthermore, there remains specifically 
the need to develop pathways to implement organisational change based on the core elements 
of safety culture within an organisation.  
A noticeable gap in the current research literature is the consideration of the barriers to and 
facilitators/enhancers of safety culture. Banks and Davey (2010) identified a number of 
organisational characteristics perceived as barriers and facilitators to the implementation of 
occupational road safety initiatives. Perceived barriers included the prioritisation of 
production over safety and complacency towards risks. Perceived facilitators included 
management commitment and supportive systems for implementation. It is not known if 
these characteristics will be viewed similarly in relation to safety culture in the construction 
industry.  
This paper reports on a research study designed to explore safety culture in a large 
Australasian construction company, with a view to understanding how safety culture theory 
and practice can be integrated to improve safety culture and related outcomes within the 
construction industry. In line with Guldenmund’s (2010) advice, the research presented here 
takes a participatory approach to investigating safety culture, using a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Gaining an understanding of organisational safety leaders’ perceptions 
of safety culture ensures that the key stakeholders in the organisation have involvement 
throughout the process and improves both the relevance of, and compliance with, the 
resulting intervention. Specifically, the research questions for this study were: How is safety 
culture understood and described by the experts in the organisation? What are the key factors 
and barriers to safety culture as understood by the organisation’s safety leaders? 
 
2. Method 
 
An exploratory approach was considered most appropriate for this study as it was seeking to 
investigate safety culture perceptions of key organisational members. In depth, semi-
structured qualitative individual interviews were conducted with a panel of safety leaders. 
Qualitative interviewing is a useful technique for assessing attitudes, perceptions and values 
as these are things that are difficult to observe in situ (Silverman, 2006). The interviews 
followed a semi-structured format consisting of open-ended questions about various aspects 
of safety culture. The questions were based on the key issues identified in the literature 
review, including defining safety culture, key factors for a positive safety culture, and barriers 
to creating and maintaining safety culture. The follow-up online questionnaire was designed 
based on the interview responses, and asked the panel to rate the most important issues 
identified as part of a confirmatory validation process.     
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods with a panel of experts is often 
referred to as a modified-Delphi method. Linstone and Turoff (1975) provide an underlying 
definition of the method: “Delphi may be characterised as a method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a 
whole, to deal with a complex problem.” The Delphi technique is a structured method used to 
gain consensus from a panel of experts (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Keeney, Hasson & 
McKenna, 2001). The process involves a number of ‘rounds’ in which participants respond to 
questions with the aim of reaching consensus in the final round. Traditional Delphi methods 
usually include three or four rounds of surveys, with each round providing the same 
information as the previous, but with group statistical data included. Each panel member then 
has an opportunity to amend their responses in light of the group data, making it an iterative 
process (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  
More recently, the Delphi method has been used with various modifications to shorten the 
process and ensure participant involvement throughout the rounds. Modified Delphi methods 
are particularly prevalent in health and policy research (Keeney et al., 2001). Benefits of the 
Delphi method include: panel members remain anonymous to one another, reducing the 
potential for influence or bias throughout the rounds; it suits groups that are geographically 
distant; information and opinions are gained from a wide range of experts; and importantly, 
the process ensures that key stakeholders are involved from the beginning, which can assist 
future policies or programs that may be developed from the results.  
The application of the Delphi method in this instance is a unique approach in the safety 
culture field. It is particularly relevant in this context due to its focus on prioritising (ranking) 
key issues. As discussed, whilst there is substantial research on safety culture, the  issues 
raised and conclusions drawn continue to be more diverse and more complex, rather than 
reductionist in nature. This research employs the Delphi method in an attempt to find the key 
issues relating to safety culture from the perspective of safety leaders.  
2.1. Participants 
Participants were 41 safety experts from within one large Australasian construction 
organisation. The benefits of a case study approach in safety research is well established 
(Hopkins, 1995) and in this case the organisation was carefully selected to maximise 
generalisability across the industry. The organisation has approximately 10,000 employees, 
and has a prominent place in the Australasian construction industry. Primarily a contracting 
business, the company also often employs subcontractors and partners with other companies 
in construction project alliances. The company is also part of a larger holdings group with 
global business operations across a range of construction, resource and property sectors. The 
organisation’s structure includes several functional and regional divisions, and has in the past 
operated as many individual businesses or silos. The formation of a Delphi panel for this 
study was therefore appropriate in encouraging discussion of the complex nature of safety 
culture, and in reaching a consensus across a diverse group of participants.  
More specifically, the divisions researched included a cross section of construction functions 
operating across a variety of industry sectors (e.g., commercial building, roads and transport, 
resources), involving a diverse workforce in terms of size and employment type, and in a 
range of environments including both rural and urban settings. At the time of data collection 
the organisation was trialing a safety culture initiative using values-based inductions and 
training workshops. This was not specifically investigated in this study; however it is relevant 
to understanding some of the findings.  
The interviewees were selected based on their current job position, relevant experience or 
through a peer nomination process. They were nominated by an organisational contact based 
on the above criteria developed by the researcher. Recruited participants were from a 
representative range of organisational positions and responsibilities, geographical locations 
and demographic backgrounds. Overall the profiles of managers participating in this study 
were similar to the workforce. In total 48 people were invited to participate and 41 completed 
interviews, representing an 85.4% response rate. Participants were recruited from various 
sites and divisions across the organisation, and all interviewees thought that safety was a 
significant part of their role. The breakdown of the participants roles were as follows: three 
Senior Executives; six Alliance Project Managers; 11 Project Managers; 10 Safety Managers; 
three Corporate Managers; three Construction Managers; one Zone Manager; one Building 
Manager; one Site Manager; one Operations Manager: and one Plant Manager. The majority 
(93%) of interviewees were male. Participants in the follow up questionnaire included 35 of 
the 41 interviewees in the first sample, representing an 83% response rate in the second 
round. This response rate was considered acceptable in this context given the turnover rate in 
the organisation at this time. The attrition in this round was explored and no systematic 
differences were identified compared to the rest of the sample.  
 
2.2. Procedure 
2.2.1. Delphi method – round one 
A combination of face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews were conducted by the 
researcher over a three month period. Participants were asked to respond to questions about 
the key issues drawn from the literature review. The questions were open-ended to solicit 
broad responses to questions about safety culture in their organisation. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with 11 participants in private office spaces in the organisation’s 
premises.  The remaining participants were interviewed via telephone during business hours 
at a mutually convenient time.  Participation was voluntary and verbal consent was obtained 
from all participants.  Participants were informed of the confidentiality of the interview and 
the anonymity of their responses. The participants were interviewed individually to elicit 
responses free from any group bias.  Interviews lasted between 20 and 60 minutes, varying 
with individuals’ willingness to share/explain their perceptions. The first 14 interviews were 
recorded and transcribed as verbatim records and transcriptions were provided to the 
interviewees to confirm their accuracy.  Following this, the rest of the interviews were 
recorded by the same researcher in note form, including verbatim quotes for key points. It 
was considered that full transcripts were not required beyond the first 14 interviewees, as 
saturation was being reached and the researcher was able to sufficiently capture confirmatory 
and/or contradictory themes in note form during the interviews.     
 
2.2.2. Delphi method – round two 
The online questionnaire was designed to confirm themes that arose in the interviews, and to 
determine perceptions around the importance of the previously identified factors and barriers. 
The questions were developed from the results of the thematic analysis conducted on the 
interview data. The questionnaire was delivered through an online survey provider, and was 
accessed by participants via a unique email link. The questionnaire was available for 
completion for approximately one month (approximately two months after the last interview), 
and participants were provided with two reminders during that period.  
 
2.3. Data Analysis 
The interview responses were analysed through a qualitative thematic analysis process. Braun 
and Clark (2006) consider thematic analysis a foundational method in qualitative analysis. 
They argue that its flexibility makes it a useful research tool, providing a rich and detailed 
account of the data. However, qualitative research is also notoriously misused in research 
Silverman (2006) and in particular, the approach is criticised as lacking rigour and 
transparency. To counter these limitations, a number of processes were followed.  
The analysis was both theoretically and empirically driven, addressing the specific research 
questions as well remaining open to unanticipated themes that emerged from the interviews. 
Each interview record was carefully examined, giving equal attention to all data and 
identifying themes through a thorough, inclusive and comprehensive coding process (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). Relevant extracts that were particularly reflective of certain themes were 
chosen to include in the findings summary. Themes were identified through collating data 
codes and creating a thematic map which was reviewed to ensure themes were internally 
meaningful, and distinct from each other. Themes are presented as they relate to each 
category of interest. 
Data from the online questionnaire were analysed using a statistical software package (PASW 
Statistics 18). Descriptive analyses were performed, including identifying means, standard 
deviations and frequency statistics.  
 
3. Findings 
The research findings described in this section were derived from the two-round modified 
Delphi method, and include data from thematic analysis of interviews and descriptive 
analyses of data from an online questionnaire with the same sample. Key themes and 
descriptive data are discussed and supported under four categories of interest: defining and 
describing safety culture; key factors contributing to positive safety culture; barriers to safety 
culture; and enhancing safety culture. 
 
3.1. Defining and describing safety culture  
In the interviews, the safety leaders were asked about how they defined and described safety 
culture. As can be seen in Table 1, the first major theme to emerge from the analysis was a 
focus on the practical side of safety culture, with many using action-oriented definitions and 
descriptions. Whilst values, beliefs and attitudes were mentioned by several interviewees, it 
seemed that most emphasis was placed on the actions, behaviours and practices of people in 
the organisation.  This was evidenced by responses that related to how things were done in 
the organisation and that safety culture is something created by the organisational members 
through their behaviours and actions. In particular, safety culture was understood to be 
largely created by the actions of influential organisational members, with interviewees 
commenting on how safety standards are reinforced by management.  This was further 
confirmed by additional responses that focused on how people acted when they were not 
being monitored by peers or management, reflecting the pervasive qualities of culture.  
Another central theme identified from the data is the understanding of safety culture as a part 
of organisational culture. Definitions and descriptions of safety culture were often grounded 
as a component or a reflection of the broader culture. The strength of this theme is evidenced 
by a number of responses around safety leaders’ view of safety culture as an “aspect”, a 
“part” or a “sub-set” of the organisational culture or team culture. Some responses included a 
statement about the relative priority given to safety, for example, whether safety was “treated 
as sacrosanct”.  
The final theme recognised in the safety leaders’ descriptions was around the implicit nature 
of safety culture. Many interviewees said that they did not use the term safety culture 
regularly, and did not have a working definition that they used. A common statement was that 
they “don’t really use a definition of safety culture”. Many preferred not to use the term 
culture, as it was considered by interviewees as too difficult to define. Another commented 
that they had not really thought about it as culture, reflecting the intangible qualities of 
culture and particularly the difficulty of viewing one’s own group in terms of cultural 
descriptions.  
Table 1. Themes associated with safety culture definitions and descriptions 
Theme Examples 
Action-oriented 
descriptions 
“The way we do things around here” 
“It’s what we do and say and execute in relation to safety” 
“Safety culture doesn’t invent itself, it is what comes out of the 
actions of people in the organisation” 
“The standard you walk past is the standard you set”  
“What people do when no-one’s looking” 
“What people do when you’re not there” 
Related to 
organisational culture 
“An aspect of general team culture, that relates to people’s 
attitudes towards safe work” 
“Safety culture is part of an organisational culture where safety is 
treated sacrosanct by the organisation” 
“I think that safety culture is a subset of organisational culture.... 
Safety is just one way an organisation expresses its culture”  
Implicit nature of 
culture 
“I don’t really use a definition of culture” 
“Culture is a funny word. It’s the way we do things and the way we 
think about things. But I’ve never really thought about it as 
culture” 
 
3.2. Key factors contributing to positive safety culture 
3.2.1. Interview themes 
Another interview topic related to what the safety leaders thought were the key factors 
contributing to positive safety culture (Table 2). The first theme to emerge from the data was 
around leadership commitment. Emphasis was placed on leaders demonstrating their 
commitment, in particular through high visibility to project sites, and through personalised 
actions and stories around safety. However some interviewees cautioned about commitment 
being genuine and with a practical focus. Cynicism towards senior leaders was talked about 
as reasonably common in the organisation, particularly in relation to espoused values not 
matching actual behaviours. This extended to site practices as well, with responses indicating 
that safety culture should be reflected in processes and practices in project work. Responses 
within this theme also reflected an emphasis on the supervisory level as key to positive safety 
culture. It was viewed as a “pinch point” that facilitated successful implementation of safety 
practices.   
A related theme identified from the data was around safety communication. The main points 
raised in relation to safety communication were around clarity and simplicity. Some 
interviewees felt that messages that were too complex were not effectively translated through 
the organisational levels. The various forms of communication were also mentioned, with 
slogans and visual communication tools such as posters being frequently cited as evidence of 
safety culture on site. The communication of leaders was also reflected in this theme, with 
their ability to effectively communicate the organisation’s vision, values, expectations and 
standards around safety seen as critical for positive safety culture.   
Table 2. Themes associated with factors contributing to positive safety culture 
Theme Examples 
Leadership commitment 
 
 
 
 
“It’s very simple and it’s exceptionally difficult. I think the thing 
that makes the biggest difference is for people on the ground to see 
people at the top talking to them about it.” 
“It’s important to these guys to see their bosses because then they 
will work hard for them and it drives performance.” 
“You have to be seen, do what you said you would do, and what 
you would expect others to do.”   
“The frontline supervisor is critical for implementation. It’s the 
people under his control are the ones that get injured. If he’s not 
on board, then no matter how much effort you put in at leadership 
level, it’s going to fail at that pinch point.”   
Safety communication “It’s no good having the best systems in the world if you can’t 
communicate information effectively.” 
“Messages are already fairly diluted once they get to the 
paddock”. 
“Not all things are important, [we need to] identify the critical few 
things that are important.” 
Workers’ involvement “Everyone in the organisation needs to live and feel the values” 
“It’s really important for the guys to get involved. And the right 
guys, the passionate ones, the ones who see how safety impacts on 
them.” 
“[We] need to be more hands on with the guys. Videos are good, 
but more during the job.” 
Defined safety 
accountabilities  
“You need accountability to make it happen. Any culture needs to 
have an element of fear around law and respect. If you take the 
Australian culture everybody knows you have to be a law abiding 
citizen to live within the Australian culture, and there are 
consequences if you step outside the cultural norm. I think it’s 
exactly the same with safety culture.” 
“Actions have consequences – positive actions have positive 
consequences and negative actions have negative consequences.”  
Simple safety systems  “I think safety culture is significantly enhanced when there is 
simplicity in terms of process and framework for the safety system” 
“Simplify the systems – make them work for you instead of you 
working for them” 
 
Another central theme identified in relation to factors contributing to positive safety culture 
was around worker involvement, engagement and participation in safety. It was recognised 
that safety culture, whilst driven by the leaders in the organisation, was largely a result of 
how the workforce thinks and acts in relation to safety. Emphasis was placed on getting 
everyone involved, and encouraging people to participate in the organisation’s safety agenda. 
The responses indicated that worker engagement in safety was considered vital to the overall 
safety effort, and interviewees talked about various methods for this, such as inductions, 
toolbox talks, videos, and workshops. Many interviewees also spoke about the involvement 
of workers in the improvement of safety processes and systems, with a focus on utilising their 
knowledge of the working conditions. In terms of safety education and competency, 
interviewees emphasised on-the-job training, coaching and mentoring as effective ways to 
engage workers in safety culture.  
 
2.3.2 Questionnaire ratings 
In the follow-up questionnaire with the panel, the safety leaders were asked to rate the 
importance of various factors contributing to positive safety culture. The rating required 
selecting the Top 3 factors from each of the sub-categories of Organisational, Leadership and 
Workforce factors. The sub-categories were identified from the interview themes, and the 
‘top three’ selection process was chosen to be consistent with the goal of panel consensus for 
Delphi methods (Keeney et al., 2001). Table 3 represents the number of people who rated 
each barrier as one of that Top 3, and the corresponding percentage. 
The organisational factors most often selected as one of the Top 3 were around the systems 
and frameworks supporting the desired culture, clearly defining safety roles and 
accountabilities, and safety being fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and 
systems. The leadership factors most often selected as one of the Top 3 were around leaders 
demonstrating a commitment to safety, encouraging personal accountability, and articulating 
a clear vision and values around safety. The workforce factors most often selected as one of 
the Top 3 were around workers understanding what safety means for them personally, being 
involved in decisions around safety, and looking out for each other on the job.  
In addition to rating the most important factors for positive safety culture, the panel were also 
asked to give a rating of how evident (on a 7-point scale from one representing never evident 
to seven representing always evident) they thought each of the factors were in the 
organisation currently (Table 4). With average ratings from the panel ranging from 3.89 to 
5.80, all the factors were considered to be at least ‘occasionally evident’ through to almost 
‘mostly evident’ in the organisation. The factor rated as most evident was around the 
organisation having a clear stance on safety, whilst the least evident factor was around 
workers being involved in improving safety processes.  
When comparing the two tables, some interesting observations can be made. In particular, the 
ratings of the importance and evidence of key organisational factors are not aligned. The 
factor around systems and frameworks supporting safety culture was most often selected as 
Top 3 for importance, but was rated as the second least evident factor in the organisation 
currently. Similarly, although not as stark, the factor around safety being integrated in 
organisational documents, processes and systems was selected as Top 3 for importance by 
48% of respondents, but rated third least evident.   
The importance and evidence of the leadership factors were much more aligned, with two of 
the Top 3 important leadership factors being viewed as ‘often evident’ and ‘sometimes 
evident’ by the safety leaders. Finally, the workforce factors varied in their alignment of 
importance and evidence, with some factors viewed as similarly important and evident, and 
others - such as workers receiving on the job training – being perceived as ‘quite evident’, but 
not as important. 
 

 Table 3. Frequencies and percentages of importance of factors contributing to 
positive safety culture (N=35) 
Organisational factors  Freq % 
The organisation’s systems and frameworks support the desired safety 
culture 
24 68.6 
Safety roles and accountabilities are clearly defined  20 57.1 
Safety is fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and 
systems 
17 48.6 
The organisation has a clear stance on safety  11 31.4 
The organisation has a system for reporting on and learning from safety 
experiences 
11 31.4 
Safety policies are consistently applied across business units in the 
organisation 
11 31.4 
Communication channels are effective for safety messages  6 17.1 
The organisation’s business operating structure (eg. Divisions) supports 
safety goals  
4 11.4 
Business units customise safety policies to meet the needs of their 
business 
1 2.9 
Leadership factors  Freq % 
Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety  32 91.4 
Leaders encourage personal accountability in relation to safety 19 54.3 
Leaders can articulate a clear vision and shared values around safety  16 45.7 
Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and concerns about safety 14 40.0 
Leaders have a clear understanding of safety culture  9 25.7 
Leaders support workers to “take safety on” in difficult situations  8 27.9 
Leaders provide practical support for safety   7 20.0 
Workforce factors  Freq % 
Workers understand what safety means for them personally  24 68.6 
Workers are involved in decisions about safety 20 57.1 
Workers “look out for each other” on the job 19 54.3 
Workers are involved in improving safety processes  15 42.9 
Workers receive on-the-job safety training 13 37.1 
Workers understand what safety culture is about  12 34.3 
Workers receive formal off-the-job safety training   2 5.7 
 
 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of how evident the factors are in the 
organisation (N = 35) (rating scale: 1= never evident, 7=always evident)   
Organisational factors  M SD 
The organisation has a clear stance on safety  5.80 1.23 
The organisation has a system for reporting on and learning from safety 
experiences 
5.40 1.04 
The organisation’s business operating structure (eg. Divisions) supports 
safety goals 
5.26 1.22 
Safety roles and accountabilities are clearly defined 4.74 1.07 
Communication channels are effective for safety messages  4.74 1.44 
Safety policies are consistently applied across business units in the 
organisation 
4.57 1.15 
Safety is fully integrated in organisational documents, processes and 
systems 
4.51 1.25 
The organisation’s systems and frameworks support the desired safety 
culture  
4.40 1.19 
Business units customise safety policies to meet the needs of their 
business 
4.40 1.36 
Leadership factors  M SD 
Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety  5.14 1.26 
Leaders encourage personal accountability in relation to safety 4.94 1.21 
Leaders support workers to “take safety on” in difficult situations 4.91 1.25 
Leaders have a clear understanding of safety culture  4.83 1.34 
Leaders can articulate a clear vision and shared values around safety  4.83 1.34 
Leaders provide practical support for safety 4.54 1.36 
Leaders listen to workers’ ideas and concerns about safety   4.34 1.31 
Workforce factors  M SD 
Workers receive on-the-job safety training  4.89 1.28 
Workers “look out for each other” on the job 4.63 0.97 
Workers understand what safety means for them personally  4.63 0.97 
Workers are involved in decisions about safety 4.17 1.18 
Workers receive formal off-the-job safety training  4.09 1.31 
Workers understand what safety culture is about  3.94 1.28 
Workers are involved in improving safety processes  3.89 1.16 
3.3. Barriers to safety culture 
3.3.1. Interview themes 
The organisational safety leaders were also interviewed about what they thought were 
barriers to both creating and maintaining safety culture in the organisation. Table 5 
provides an overview of the key themes and extracts from the interviews. The first 
major theme to emerge was around competing business priorities, including 
production and cost pressures, and workload and time pressures. One interviewee’s 
comments on safety being an add-on, with “perceived time and cost implications” 
reflected this theme by displaying how safety is viewed as an extra activity on top of 
usual business, rather than something that is integrated in existing business activities. 
The benefits of operating safely were seen as less tangible than the benefits of 
meeting production outputs and time/cost charts. The responses indicated that middle 
management felt production and cost pressures the most, and that the organisation 
needed to support managers and supervisors in managing their workload, and 
ensuring safety is included when scoping roles. The strength of this theme is 
evidenced by responses about the compromising of safety in order to meet production 
pressures. This was further confirmed by additional responses that maintaining safety 
awareness was a barrier to safety culture, and that it was important to keep it alive and 
avoid being complacent about safety risks when other issues appear more urgent.  
Another central theme to emerge in relation to barriers to safety culture was around 
workforce issues. These included the transience of the subcontractor workforce and 
the difficulties of managing individual differences. Subcontractor management was a 
significant barrier raised by many interviewees, not only in relation to the short work 
periods they perform, but also in terms of having to deal with cultural integration and 
competency gaps. Responses indicated that some safety leaders thought this issue 
increased risks on projects, and was seen as a significant barrier to safety culture in 
recent years and into the future. Also related to the theme of workforce issues were 
individual differences amongst the workers.  Responses recognised that people are 
different, and that different educational methods are required to get the safety culture 
message across. However, some safety leaders thought that education was not enough 
to change some workers’ behaviours, and that ultimately safety decisions will be 
made by individuals and they might not always be the right decisions.    
The third theme identified from the data around safety culture barriers was in relation 
to the change process itself, including the amount and pace of change and putting 
things into practice. Responses indicated that the safety leaders felt the organisation 
was experiencing exponential growth and fast changes in both the workforce and 
organisational systems, and that this hindered positive cultural development. Other 
responses in relation to the change process theme suggested that the some changes 
were not happening quickly enough, particularly in relation to operationalising safety 
culture initiatives.  
The final theme to emerge from the interviews with safety leaders related to industry 
barriers. These included issues around legislative complexity, a poor regulatory 
system for the industry and competition issues with other construction companies.  
Responses suggested that there was a concern about the organisation’s safety goals 
not being supported by the legislative and regulatory systems for the industry. The 
legislative requirements around safety were viewed as complex and requiring a lot of 
‘paperwork’. The impact was perceived to stretch to internal systems, that many felt 
were further complicating legislative requirements, and were not sufficiently 
integrated into other organisational processes. Within this theme, responses also 
reflected a concern about the company’s competitiveness within the industry, as other 
companies who did not have the same safety standards could potentially win more 
work if evaluated on a (financial) cost basis.  
Table 5. Themes associated with barriers to safety culture  
Theme and sub-themes Examples 
Competing business priorities 
 
- Production and cost 
pressures 
 
- Workload and time 
pressures 
 
 
 
- Maintaining a high level 
of awareness 
“We live in a life where safety is an add-on, rather than a part 
of doing business. That means that there are perceived time 
and cost implications.”  
“The issue is middle management – they still feel the pressures 
of production and cost. They need to participate in it [safety 
culture].” 
 “People become daunted by the volume of what is required. 
They become overwhelmed and can’t see where to start. We 
need to help them see where to start by prioritising issues and 
providing support.” 
 “The reality is that compromises are made when the pressure 
is on.” 
“It’s hard to keep it as a priority – I find it hard – because 
there’s so much else on.” 
Workforce issues 
- Subcontractor transience  
- Individual differences 
 
 
“It’s like you’re starting from scratch all the time.” 
 “Each individual thinks about safety in a different way” 
“A common barrier is employee behaviour – people still 
willing to put themselves at risk. We provide all the 
encouragement and guidance and everything under the sun but 
sometime will still make a decision to do it a different way” 
The change process 
- Too much change too 
quickly 
 
 
- Putting things into practice 
 
 
 
“Culture takes a while to build, and it takes a while for that 
culture to mature.  If you are forever changing the leadership, 
the systems, the expectations or the values, the culture never 
has time to embed itself and mature. It generally just stays as 
more reactive.” 
“The issue is in changing from theory to practice” 
“Everyone is saying the right things but we’re just not seeing 
things getting done, it’s taking too long. Give us the tools - we 
want to do it, not just talk about it” 
Industry issues 
- Legislative complexity  
 
 
- Regulatory system 
 
 
 
- Competitive nature of 
industry 
 
“One of the biggest barriers I see is with the system that has 
been created to manage safety on big projects like this is, 
trying to comply with the multitudes of standards, regs, 
governing bodies, federal bodies. And they are constantly 
changing expectations and goalposts.” 
“It is a big call to ask [the company] to be a leader on this on 
their own. It would be much easier if all the big construction 
companies could come on board or if we had a similar 
regulatory system [as the oil and mining industries]”. 
“The building business is competitive and we compete against 
people who don’t have the same safety standards as us” 
 “Will [the company] still win work if we are more 
expensive?” 
 3.3.2. Questionnaire ratings  
In the follow-up questionnaire, the safety leaders were asked to select their Top 5 
barriers from a list derived from the interviews. Given the number of barriers 
identified in the interviews, and the various levels at which they operate, the selection 
of five barriers was considered most appropriate to capture potential variation 
amongst participants. Table 6 represents the number of people who rated each barrier 
as one of that Top 5, and the corresponding percentage.  
Table 6. Frequencies and percentages for the most significant barriers to creating and 
maintaining safety culture (N=35) 
Most significant barriers  Freq % 
Difficulties with subcontractor management and operations  22 62.9 
Too much paperwork  21 60.0 
The challenge of “Keeping it fresh”  16 45.7 
Low levels of competency in safety leadership roles   17 48.6 
Transience of the workforce  16 45.7 
Too much change too quickly  15 42.9 
Competing business priorities eg. production versus safety  13 37.1 
Maintaining a high level of safety awareness even when incidents aren’t occurring 12 34.3 
Excessive workload  11 31.4 
Complexity of safety legislation 7 20.0 
Not enough safety resources   7 20.0 
Financial costs associated with safety   6 17.1 
Competitive nature of the industry  5 14.3 
“Bad attitudes” about safety  4 11.4 
Poor regulatory system for industry 3 8.6 
 
As can be seen in the table, subcontractor management and operations was seen as a 
significant barrier by 63% of respondents. Similarly, the transience of the workforce 
rated as a Top 5 barrier by 45% of the sample. This is reflected more strongly here 
than in the interview data. In addition, too much paperwork was also rated as a 
significant barrier by 60% of respondents, relating to the identified interview theme of 
industry barriers to safety culture, and in particular legislative requirements. However, 
comments around this theme also referred to internal processes complicating these 
issues, so the rating could also be reflective of a lack of alignment and support for 
safety culture. Interestingly, other industry issues discussed in the interview themes 
did not rate as highly here, with only 14% and 8% rating the competitive nature and 
poor regulatory systems respectively as one of the their Top 5 barriers.  
Other barriers rated as significant by a high proportion of respondents related to 
‘keeping it fresh’, competency in leadership roles, and the pace of change.  
Interestingly, competing business priorities was only rated as a Top 5 barrier by 37% 
of respondents, despite this being a key theme identified in the interviews.  It is 
possible that the competing business priorities item was presented too broadly to rate 
highly in the questionnaire responses.    
3.4. Enhancing and improving safety culture  
3.4.1. Interview themes 
After discussing safety culture factors and barriers, interviewees were asked about 
how they thought the organisation could enhance or improve its safety culture over 
the next few years. This question was really around how these experts thought the 
factors could be operationalised in the business, and how barriers may be overcome.  
The view on the organisation’s safety culture in the future was very positive, despite 
the considerable barriers described in section 3.3. Many interviewees expressed a 
view that continuous effort would lead to an improved culture. One interviewee said 
“You just have to stay at it....take stock regularly – sit back, check if the conditions 
have changed and if we need to do something differently”. Similarly, other 
interviewees commented that “Safety is like riding a bike up a hill – as soon as you 
stop pedalling you go backwards” and “Success will come through persistence – it’s 
a fragile space, safety”. The fragility of the organisation’s safety culture was also 
reflected in an interviewees comment that “It’s much harder to build a culture than 
break a culture”. Another recognised that the cultural journey was not a fast one and 
that the organisation was “still working on ownership and understanding – it takes 
time.”  
Simplicity and consistency of cultural messages, material, processes and frameworks 
was also considered critical to the improvement of safety culture in the organisation. 
One interviewee emphasised that “not all things are important, [we need to] identify 
the critical few things that are important”. Another interviewee extended this, “I 
think safety culture is significantly enhanced when there is simplicity in terms of 
process and framework for the safety system”. This was something that should be lead 
by the organisation’s leaders, through improved visibility – “I would like to see more 
from corporate and branch leadership in being visible, particularly to projects. It’s 
not just about what they say it’s what they do.” It was also suggested that systems and 
cultural objectives should be better aligned and integrated into an overarching safety 
management system.  
Other comments related to improved change management of the cultural change 
process, including establishing a core group of change agents to assist the 
organisation in moving towards its cultural targets. The roles of corporate areas were 
also discussed, in particular around the improved coordination of safety efforts, 
including more guidance and support from corporate areas to reduce inconsistency 
and inefficiency across projects. Finally, it was recognised that the organisation’s 
growth and pace of change was critical to consider in any cultural approach to safety. 
Including considering sustainability and flexibility to adapt to changing markets, 
“Whatever we put in place now needs to be sustainable and grow with the 
organisation.” 
3.4.2. Questionnaire ratings 
In the follow-up questionnaire, panel members were asked to rank their Top 3 
strategies for enhancing safety culture in the organisation from a list derived from the 
interviews. Table 7 represents the number of people who rated each strategy as one of 
that Top 3, and the corresponding percentage.  
Table 7. Frequencies and percentages for the most important strategies to enhance 
safety culture in the organisation (N=35)   
Strategies to enhance safety culture  Freq % 
Ensuring the systems support the desired safety culture 23 65.7 
Having clear and simple safety messages  19 54.3 
Defining safety leadership roles and accountabilities  16 45.7 
Managing safety culture as a change process  15 42.9 
Having a framework for enforcing safety accountabilities  13 37.1 
Making sure the business is ready for relevant safety culture initiatives 7 20.0 
Identifying and supporting change agents/ champions across the organisation 7 20.0 
Communicating organisational safety priorities 5 14.3 
    
The results support the key interview themes identified, with systems supporting 
safety culture and clear and simple safety messages being most commonly rated as 
important strategies to enhance safety culture.  Defining safety roles and 
accountabilities and having a framework for enforcing these were also considered 
important strategies by a number of respondents. Interestingly, communicating 
organisational safety priorities was only rated in the Top 3 most important by 14% of 
the panel.  
However, it is important to recognise that some strategies may have been rated as 
more important because they are perceived as currently lacking in the organisation, 
and are therefore ‘top of the list’ for improvement. Other strategies may not have been 
chosen as the Top 3 because they were not seen as urgent, or they were seen as 
already operating within areas of the organisation.  
 
4. Discussion 
This study aimed to explore how safety culture is understood and described by experts 
in a large Australasian construction organisation, and to determine the key factors and 
barriers to safety culture as understood by the organisation’s safety leaders. This case 
study research provides a foundation for the development of relevant and practical 
safety culture change programs in the construction and related industries. 
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ definitions and descriptions of safety 
culture highlight that their understanding of safety culture related to the actions and 
behaviours of the workforce, and in particular how people acted in their normal mode 
of operation. The descriptions also recognised the link between safety culture and the 
organisation’s broader culture. Relating this to the layered view of culture, the outer 
layer of artefacts was reflected in descriptions much more than the middle or core 
layers.  Given the nature of the construction industry, and the dominant disciplines 
within it – engineers, project managers, and construction workers – it is not surprising 
that the tangible components of complex concepts such as culture are given emphasis. 
The implication of this is that many theory-based definitions of safety culture may not 
be understood and accepted in practice, and having simple and practical messages 
about safety was important to the safety leaders in this sample.  
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ understanding of the safety culture 
factors revealed that, consistent with the literature (e.g., Banks & Davey, 2010), 
leadership was identified as a key factor for positive safety culture in the organisation, 
and there was an emphasis on leaders demonstrating commitment to safety, and being 
visible to the project-based workforce. These findings align with the functionalist 
perspective, which views culture as something that can be deliberately influenced to 
support management strategies and systems (Glendon et al., 2006). Perhaps this is not 
surprising, given that the sample were all leaders themselves, and likely have 
experience in attempting to influence culture in their workplace. However, the 
emphasis on visibility and tactile relationships between frontline workers and senior 
management is critical in the context of construction work, and highlights the need for 
values to be translated into behaviours for a positive safety culture (Biggs et al., 
2005).   
Also consistent with the literature was an emphasis on effective communication and 
worker’s involvement in safety. A number of studies across various samples and 
industries have established the importance of these factors in fostering and 
maintaining a positive safety culture (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Dingsag et al., 
2007; Zohar, 2010). This study has confirmed the relevance and importance of these 
factors in a construction context. 
Perhaps less obvious in the literature but clear and consistent in this sample was the 
theme around simple and streamlined safety systems being critical to supporting 
cultural goals.  This could reflect current organisational maturity around safety, in so 
far as a focus on systems is considered to be reflective of a reasonably immature 
culture (Hudson, 2007). Alternatively, it could reflect a broader systems view of the 
organisation as described in Semler’s (1997) alignment theory, whereby 
organisational performance is a result of good alignment between the various 
elements, including culture and processes/systems. It is possible that culture may be 
effectively influenced indirectly via other organisational elements, which could have 
significant implications for safety culture practitioners in the development of cultural 
initiatives.  
The key themes identified in the safety leaders’ perceptions of barriers to safety 
culture identified a number of issues that were viewed as significant to the 
development and maintenance of safety culture, and are likely to impact upon safety 
culture initiatives within the organisation. The company has built its reputation on its 
‘can-do attitude’ to projects, and this has commonly been interpreted as a high 
production focus. Managers are now trying to reinterpret this as a ‘can-do safely’ 
approach to construction works, but there are clearly some perceived contradictions 
with this. The safety leaders raised diverse issues such as the transient subcontractor 
workforce, legislative and regulatory difficulties, and the challenge of maintaining 
safety awareness under high production pressures. The challenges presented by the 
subcontractor workforce may be fairly unique to the construction industry, but the 
other key barriers are likely to be experienced by many organisations across various 
industries. Whilst these barriers may not be possible to overcome in the short term, 
their impact can be lessened if they are identified early in the change process. The 
consideration of barriers is not common in the current research literature (see Banks 
& Davey, 2010, for an exception), but is critical to the ultimate success of any change 
intervention.  
More broadly, the safety leaders’ perceptions of culture reflect their understanding 
that culture change is complex, difficult, and time-consuming, and that values and 
ideals are difficult to translate into practice. However, this is balanced by a mostly 
functional view of culture, whereby culture is viewed as something that can be 
proactively influenced, and that leaders are the drivers of cultural change. Any change 
must be cognisant of current organisational maturity and change readiness, as well as 
the influence of barriers to that change.  
Given that this research has important applications within the safety culture field, 
further research would be beneficial to continue to explore the role of leaders’ 
perceptions in developing and maintaining positive safety culture in organisations. 
The organisation sampled here is argued to be representative of the Australasian 
construction industry; however it is important for future research to determine 
whether these research findings on safety culture factors and barriers are experienced 
globally. Furthermore, it is recognised that frontline workers may interpret leaders’ 
cultural messages differently, and it is important to test cultural descriptions and 
understandings with this level of the workforce. Particularly relevant in this study is 
the possible influence of social desirability biases within the management group. 
Future research should also consider surveying a broader cross-section of the 
workforce to start mapping the pathway between safety culture and safety outcomes at 
the individual and group level.  
In conclusion, this study is unique in that it derived safety culture descriptions from 
key stakeholders within a large Australasian construction organisation, as opposed to 
imposing traditional conceptualisations of safety culture that are not customised for 
the organisation or the construction industry more broadly. The strength of the study 
is that the interviewees included recognised safety leaders within the organisation, and 
were in a position to provide expert opinion on their understanding of safety culture. 
Insights gained from this research are critical to both researchers and practitioners 
attempting to integrate safety culture theory and practice to improve safety outcomes.   
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